From Utterances to Speech Acts.
This is naturalistic theory of when, how and why our utterances are interpreted as speech acts: assertions, orders or promises.
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| Author / Creator: | |
|---|---|
| Format: | eBook Electronic |
| Language: | English |
| Imprint: | New York : Cambridge University Press, 2013. |
| Subjects: | |
| Local Note: | Electronic reproduction. Ann Arbor, Michigan : ProQuest Ebook Central, 2022. Available via World Wide Web. Access may be limited to ProQuest Ebook Central affiliated libraries. |
| Online Access: | Click to View |
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| 100 | 1 | |a Kissine, Mikhail. | |
| 245 | 1 | 0 | |a From Utterances to Speech Acts. |
| 264 | 1 | |a New York : |b Cambridge University Press, |c 2013. | |
| 264 | 4 | |c ©2013. | |
| 300 | |a 1 online resource (210 pages) | ||
| 336 | |a text |b txt |2 rdacontent | ||
| 337 | |a computer |b c |2 rdamedia | ||
| 338 | |a online resource |b cr |2 rdacarrier | ||
| 505 | 0 | |a Intro -- Contents -- Figures -- Acknowledgements -- Abbreviations -- Introduction -- 0.1 Motivation -- 0.2 Conventional and non-conventional speech acts -- 0.3 The two main ingredients of the account -- 0.4 Outline of the book -- 1 Austins distinctions revisited -- 1.1 Austins levels of meaning and Davidsons philosophy of action -- 1.2 Perlocutionary acts and causal effects -- 1.3 From phatic to locutionary acts -- 1.3.1 Phatic acts and semantic contents -- 1.3.2 Austin on rhetic and locutionary acts -- 1.3.3 Locutionary acts and propositional content -- 1.4 Locutionary acts and expressions of Intentional states -- 1.5 Conclusion -- 2 Intentional states and locutionary acts -- 2.1 Direction of fit -- 2.2 De re and de dicto -- 2.3 Potentiality and Intentional states -- 2.4 Intentions -- 2.5 Potentiality in language -- 2.5.1 Updating information states -- 2.5.2 A short excursus on epistemic possibility -- 2.5.3 Potentiality: a property of locutionary acts -- 2.5.4 Precautionary notes -- 2.6 Functions in language and mind -- 2.6.1 Functions: direct and derived -- 2.6.2 Functions and context -- 2.6.3 Locutionary and illocutionary functions -- 2.7 Functional isomorphism between locutionary acts and Intentional states -- 2.8 Conclusion -- 3 Constative speech acts -- 3.1 Influencing the addressees beliefs -- 3.2 Constative speech acts as reasons to believe -- 3.3 When the constative force is missing -- 3.3.1 Irony -- 3.3.2 Platitudes -- 3.3.3 Soliloquies -- 3.4 The function of constative illocutionary acts -- 3.5 The contents of constative illocutionary acts -- 3.5.1 Direct versus indirect -- 3.5.2 Commitment to the performance versus commitment to the content -- 3.6 Trust and communication -- 3.7 The origins of truth-commitment -- 3.8 Assertions and commitment -- 3.9 Presupposition accommodation -- 3.10 Conclusion -- 4 Directive speech acts. | |
| 505 | 8 | |a 4.1 Against perlocutionary accounts: again -- 4.2 Directive speech acts as reasons to act -- 4.3 Directive speech acts, potentiality and possibility -- 4.4 Desirability -- 4.5 Indirect versus secondary directive speech acts -- 4.5.1 Sentence-types and illocutionary forces -- 4.5.2 Primary and indirect speech acts -- 4.6 When the directive force is missing -- 4.7 Conclusion -- 5 Speech acts, autism spectrum disorders and typical development -- 5.1 Autism spectrum disorders: pragmatics and mindreading -- 5.2 Varieties of false-belief tasks -- 5.3 False-belief tasks and cognitive flexibility -- 5.4 Perspective-shifting: immature versus impaired -- 5.4.1 Implicit belief attribution -- 5.4.2 Counterfactual reasoning -- 5.4.3 Pretence -- 5.4.4 Joint attention -- 5.5 Perspective-shifting and communication -- 5.5.1 Constative speech acts -- 5.5.2 Directive speech acts -- 5.6 Pragmatics in ASDs -- 5.7 Conclusion -- 6 Commissive speech acts -- 6.1 Conventions and promises -- 6.2 A semantic solution? -- 6.3 Explaining the commitment -- 6.3.1 Commissives versus first-person directives -- 6.3.2 Expression of intentions -- 6.3.3 Predictions and expression of intentions -- 6.3.4 Commitment -- 6.4 Threats -- 6.5 Cognitive underpinnings of commissives -- 6.6 Conclusion -- Conclusion -- References -- Index. | |
| 520 | |a This is naturalistic theory of when, how and why our utterances are interpreted as speech acts: assertions, orders or promises. | ||
| 588 | |a Description based on publisher supplied metadata and other sources. | ||
| 590 | |a Electronic reproduction. Ann Arbor, Michigan : ProQuest Ebook Central, 2022. Available via World Wide Web. Access may be limited to ProQuest Ebook Central affiliated libraries. | ||
| 650 | 0 | |a Speech acts (Linguistics). | |
| 650 | 0 | |a Oral communication. | |
| 650 | 0 | |a Discourse analysis. | |
| 650 | 0 | |a Pragmatics. | |
| 650 | 0 | |a Semantics. | |
| 655 | 4 | |a Electronic books. | |
| 776 | 0 | 8 | |i Print version: |a Kissine, Mikhail |t From Utterances to Speech Acts |d New York : Cambridge University Press,c2013 |z 9781107009769 |
| 797 | 2 | |a ProQuest (Firm) | |
| 856 | 4 | 0 | |u https://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/well/detail.action?docID=1139575 |z Click to View |