A course in microeconomic theory /
David M. Kreps has developed a text in microeconomics that is both challenging and "user-friendly." The work is designed for the first-year graduate microeconomic theory course and is accessible to advanced undergraduates as well. Placing unusual emphasis on modern noncooperative game theo...
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Format: | eBook Electronic |
Language: | English |
Language notes: | In English. |
Imprint: | Princeton, New Jersey : Princeton University Press, 2021. |
Subjects: | |
Online Access: | Click here for full text |
Table of Contents:
- Cover
- Title
- Copyright
- Dedication
- contents
- preface
- chapter one: An overview
- 1.1. The basic categories: Actors, behavior, institutions, and equilibrium
- 1.2. The purpose of microeconomic theory
- 1.3. Scope, detail, emphasis, and complexity
- 1.4. A précis of the plot
- part I: Individual and social choice
- chapter two: The theory of consumer choice and demand
- Prologue to part I
- 2.1. Preferences and choices
- 2.2. Marshallian demand without derivatives
- 2.3. Marshallian demand with derivatives
- 2.4. Aggregate demand
- 2.5. Bibliographic notes
- 2.6. Problems
- chapter three: Choice under uncertainty
- 3.1. Von Neumann-Morgenstern expected utility
- 3.2. On utility for money
- 3.3. Applications to market demand
- 3.4. States of nature and subjective probability
- 3.5. Problems with these models
- 3.6. Normative applications of the theory
- 3.7. Bibliographic notes
- 3.8. Problems
- chapter four: Dynamic choice
- 4.1. Optimal dynamic strategies
- 4.2. Menus and meals
- 4.3. Bibliographic notes and discussion
- 4.4. Problems
- chapter five: Social choice and efficiency
- 5.1. The problem
- 5.2. Pareto efficiency and optimality: Definitions
- 5.3. Benevolent social dictators and social welfare functionals
- 5.4. Characterizing efficient social outcomes
- 5.5. Social choice rules and Arrow's possibility theorem
- 5.6. Bibliographic notes
- 5.7. Problems
- part II: The price mechanism
- chapter six: Pure exchange and general equilibrium
- Prologue to part II
- 6.1. Pure exchange and price equilibrium
- 6.2. Why (not) believe in Walrasian equilibrium?
- 6.3. The efficiency of a general equilibrium
- 6.4. Existence and the number of equilibria
- 6.5. Time, uncertainty, and general equilibrium
- 6.6. Bibliographic notes
- 6.7. Problems
- chapter seven: The neoclassical firm
- 7.1. Models of the firm's technological capabilities
- 7.2. The profit function
- 7.3. Conditional factor demands and cost functions
- 7.4. From profit or cost functions to technology sets
- 7.5. Cost functions and -runs
- 7.6. Bibliographic notes
- 7.7. Problems
- chapter eight: The competitive firm and perfect competition
- 8.1. A perfectly competitive market
- 8.2. Perfect competition and -runs
- 8.3. What's wrong with partial equilibrium analysis?
- 8.4. General equilibrium with firms
- 8.5. Bibliographic notes
- 8.6. Problems
- chapter nine: Monopoly
- 9.1. The standard theory
- 9.2. Maintaining monopoly
- 9.3. Multigood monopoly
- 9.4. Nonlinear pricing
- 9.5. Monopoly power?
- 9.6. Bibliographic notes
- 9.7. Problems
- chapter ten: Imperfect competition
- 10.1. The classic models of duopoly
- 10.2. Bibliographic notes and discussion
- 10.3. Problems
- part III: Noncooperative game theory
- chapter eleven: Modeling competitive situations
- Prologue to part III
- 11.1. Games in extensive form: An example