A course in microeconomic theory /

A course in microeconomic theory /

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David M. Kreps has developed a text in microeconomics that is both challenging and "user-friendly." The work is designed for the first-year graduate microeconomic theory course and is accessible to advanced undergraduates as well. Placing unusual emphasis on modern noncooperative game theo...

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Bibliographic Details
Author / Creator: Kreps, David M. (Author)
Format: eBook Electronic
Language:English
Language notes:In English.
Imprint: Princeton, New Jersey : Princeton University Press, 2021.
Subjects:
Microeconomics.
Microéconomie.
BUSINESS & ECONOMICS > Economics > General.
Microeconomics
Online Access:Click here for full text
Table of Contents:
  • Cover
  • Title
  • Copyright
  • Dedication
  • contents
  • preface
  • chapter one: An overview
  • 1.1. The basic categories: Actors, behavior, institutions, and equilibrium
  • 1.2. The purpose of microeconomic theory
  • 1.3. Scope, detail, emphasis, and complexity
  • 1.4. A précis of the plot
  • part I: Individual and social choice
  • chapter two: The theory of consumer choice and demand
  • Prologue to part I
  • 2.1. Preferences and choices
  • 2.2. Marshallian demand without derivatives
  • 2.3. Marshallian demand with derivatives
  • 2.4. Aggregate demand
  • 2.5. Bibliographic notes
  • 2.6. Problems
  • chapter three: Choice under uncertainty
  • 3.1. Von Neumann-Morgenstern expected utility
  • 3.2. On utility for money
  • 3.3. Applications to market demand
  • 3.4. States of nature and subjective probability
  • 3.5. Problems with these models
  • 3.6. Normative applications of the theory
  • 3.7. Bibliographic notes
  • 3.8. Problems
  • chapter four: Dynamic choice
  • 4.1. Optimal dynamic strategies
  • 4.2. Menus and meals
  • 4.3. Bibliographic notes and discussion
  • 4.4. Problems
  • chapter five: Social choice and efficiency
  • 5.1. The problem
  • 5.2. Pareto efficiency and optimality: Definitions
  • 5.3. Benevolent social dictators and social welfare functionals
  • 5.4. Characterizing efficient social outcomes
  • 5.5. Social choice rules and Arrow's possibility theorem
  • 5.6. Bibliographic notes
  • 5.7. Problems
  • part II: The price mechanism
  • chapter six: Pure exchange and general equilibrium
  • Prologue to part II
  • 6.1. Pure exchange and price equilibrium
  • 6.2. Why (not) believe in Walrasian equilibrium?
  • 6.3. The efficiency of a general equilibrium
  • 6.4. Existence and the number of equilibria
  • 6.5. Time, uncertainty, and general equilibrium
  • 6.6. Bibliographic notes
  • 6.7. Problems
  • chapter seven: The neoclassical firm
  • 7.1. Models of the firm's technological capabilities
  • 7.2. The profit function
  • 7.3. Conditional factor demands and cost functions
  • 7.4. From profit or cost functions to technology sets
  • 7.5. Cost functions and -runs
  • 7.6. Bibliographic notes
  • 7.7. Problems
  • chapter eight: The competitive firm and perfect competition
  • 8.1. A perfectly competitive market
  • 8.2. Perfect competition and -runs
  • 8.3. What's wrong with partial equilibrium analysis?
  • 8.4. General equilibrium with firms
  • 8.5. Bibliographic notes
  • 8.6. Problems
  • chapter nine: Monopoly
  • 9.1. The standard theory
  • 9.2. Maintaining monopoly
  • 9.3. Multigood monopoly
  • 9.4. Nonlinear pricing
  • 9.5. Monopoly power?
  • 9.6. Bibliographic notes
  • 9.7. Problems
  • chapter ten: Imperfect competition
  • 10.1. The classic models of duopoly
  • 10.2. Bibliographic notes and discussion
  • 10.3. Problems
  • part III: Noncooperative game theory
  • chapter eleven: Modeling competitive situations
  • Prologue to part III
  • 11.1. Games in extensive form: An example

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