Sources of knowledge : on the concept of a rational capacity for knowledge /

Sources of knowledge : on the concept of a rational capacity for knowledge /

"How can human beings, who are liable to error, possess knowledge, since the grounds on which we believe do not rule out that we are wrong? Andrea Kern argues that we can disarm this skeptical doubt by conceiving knowledge as an act of a rational capacity. In this book, she develops a metaphysi...

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Bibliographic Details
Uniform title:Quellen des Wissens.
Author / Creator: Kern, Andrea (Author)
Other Authors / Creators:Smyth, Daniel, translator.
Format: eBook Electronic
Language:English
German
Imprint: Cambridge, Massachusetts : Harvard University Press, 2017.
Subjects:
Knowledge, Theory of.
Reason.
Error.
Théorie de la connaissance.
Raison.
epistemology.
reason.
PHILOSOPHY > Epistemology.
PHILOSOPHY / Epistemology
Error
Knowledge, Theory of
Reason
Online Access:Click here for full text
Table of Contents:
  • Introduction: "But we can always err!"
  • part 1. Knowledge and reason. Finite knowledge ; Finite justification
  • part 2. The primacy of knowledge. Doubting knowledge ; The dilemma of epistemology ; What are grounds?
  • part 3. The nature of knowledge. Rational capacities ; Rational capacities for knowledge ; Rational capacities and circumstances
  • part 4. The teleology of knowledge. The teleology of capacities ; Knowledge and practice.
  • Introduction: "But we can always err!"
  • Part 1. Knowledge and reason
  • I. Finite knowledge
  • Who are "we"?: a Kantian answer
  • Knowledge from the standpoint of reason
  • The dogma: justification without truth
  • The puzzle: truth-guaranteeing grounds
  • II. Finite justification
  • Agrippa's trilemma
  • Two answers to Agrippa's trilemma
  • The category of a truth-guaranteeing ground
  • Are we familiar with grounds belonging to this category?
  • The role of perceptual grounds
  • Part 2. The primacy of knowledge
  • III. Doubting knowledge
  • Objectivity and the possibility of error
  • The paradox of knowledge
  • Is philosophy necessarily skeptical?
  • IV. The dilemma of epistemology
  • The general redemption strategy: less is more!
  • The internalist variant
  • The externalist variant
  • The paradox returns
  • V. What are grounds?
  • The rigorous reading: Hume and Kant
  • Grounds and facts
  • A transcendental argument
  • Causality or normativity: a false dichotomy
  • The primacy of knowledge
  • Part 3. The nature of knowledge
  • VI. Rational capacities
  • The category of a rational capacity
  • Rational capacities as constitutive unities
  • Habits and regulative rules
  • The normativity of rational capacities
  • Aristotle's conception of a dynamis meta logou
  • Rational capacities as self-conscious, normative explanations
  • VII. Rational capacities for knowledge
  • Knowledge as rational capacity
  • Knowledge of the explanation of knowledge
  • Knowledge as self-conscious actualization of a norm
  • Knowledge and non-accidentality
  • VIII. Rational capacities and circumstances
  • The asymmetry of knowledge and error
  • Favorable and unfavorable circumstances
  • Fallible capacities and knowledge
  • Doxastic responsibility and knowledge
  • Part 4. The teleology of knowledge
  • IX. The teleology of capacities
  • Virtue epistemology and "epistemic capacities": a critique
  • Capacities as a species of teleological causality: a Kantian approach
  • Kant's refutation of the idea of an "implanted subjective disposition"
  • Knowledge as a self-constituting capacity
  • X. Knowledge and practice
  • Rational capacities and practice
  • How does one acquire a rational capacity fo knowledge?
  • Knowledge and objectivity
  • Skepticism and philosophy.

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